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Abstract
As the sustained and devastating extent of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic becomes apparent, a key focus of public scrutiny in the UK has centred on the
novel legal and regulatory measures introduced in response to the virus. When those
measures were first implemented in March 2020 by the UK Government, it was thought
that human rights obligations would limit excesses of governmental action and that the
public had more to fear from unwarranted intrusion into civil liberties. However, within
the first year of the pandemic’s devastation in the UK, a different picture has emerged:
rather than through action, it is governmental inaction that has given rise to greater human
rights concerns. The UK Government has been roundly criticized for its inadequate
response, including missteps in decision-making, delayed implementation and poor
enforcement of lockdown measures, abandonment of testing, shortages of critical re-
sources and inadequate test and trace methods. In this article, we analyse the UK
Government’s missteps and compare themwith published international guidance; we also
contrast the UK’s decisions with those taken by several other countries (including the
devolved administrations within the UK) to understand how its actions and inactions have
contributed to unfavourable outcomes. Using an analytical perspective that demonstrates
how human rights are both a protection from the power of the state and a requirement that
governmental powers are used to protect the lives, health and wellbeing of citizens, we
argue that the UK Government’s failure to exercise their powers competently allowed the
virus to spread without ensuring the country had the means to manage a high case load.
This abject failure has led to one of the highest rates of deaths per capita worldwide. We
offer several lessons that can be learnt from this unfortunate, but preventable, situation.
Keywords COVID-19 . UnitedKingdom . Human rights . Law . Preparedness
Asian Bioethics Review
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41649-020-00151-1
* Graeme T. Laurie
Graeme.Laurie@ed.ac.uk
1 School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Introduction
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is an ongoing global crisis
caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2).
First formally identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, the virus was declared a
public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) by the World Health
Organization (WHO) on 30 January 2020, and then declared a pandemic on 11
March 2020 (World Health Organization 2020d). The virus is highly contagious, with
potential to cause severe illness or death; indeed, as of the time of writing, COVID-19
has infected tens of millions of people worldwide, and, factoring in the suspected large-
scale undercount across the globe, the death toll has exceeded one million (and by some
estimates, is closer to two million) (The Economist 2020b). Given the high risk to life,
governments around the world have enacted a raft of measures to try to stop its spread.
This has significant implications for human rights, including the rights to life, liberty
and security of a person (World Health Organization 2020b).
COVID-19 hit the United Kingdom (UK) with force beginning in March 2020,
though the virus was undoubtedly circulating across the country in the months prior.
On 11 March, the day the WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, there were 70
reported cases in the UK in the preceding 24 hours; by 31 March, there were 2726
cases in the preceding 24 hours (Public Health England 2020b). In the early stages of
the pandemic, the focus of much public scrutiny was on the human rights implications
(Laurie 2020), particularly of the newly introduced legislative and regulatory measures,
such as the Coronavirus Act 2020, and other subsequent legislation (Hosali 2020;
Parpworth 2020). Concern was expressed about the potential inference with freedoms
and civil liberties, particularly freedom of movement. However, what has transpired in
the subsequent months is not so much a picture of interference with human rights
through governmental action, but rather a scene of extensive interference through
governmental inaction. This is most clear when the UK’s response is compared to that
of other countries and the results they have achieved.
It is now evident that some countries are managing the ongoing crisis relatively well,
with notably fewer cases and deaths. The UK is not among these. It has experienced
one of the worst-case outbreaks in the first wave of infection, making it one of the worst
affected in the world at the time of writing this article1 (Our World in Data 2020d). In
July 2020, it was reported that England had the highest excess death rate in Europe over
first half of the year (Office for National Statistics 2020b). Moreover, these figures are
considered to be an underestimate due to severely limited testing capacity at the start of
the pandemic in March and April (Perrigo 2020). The UK has one of the highest rate of
deaths per capita of any large country (Our World in Data 2020b)—currently 62
confirmed deaths per 100,000 people. Public opinion and indeed consensus have been
reached already, across the political divide, that something has gone terribly wrong
(Devlin and Connaughton 2020). In this article, we argue that that something, and that
wrong, have been the inaction and incompetence of the UK Government, which in
consequence has likely breached the human rights of its citizens.
In what follows, we first explore how the UK Government’s approach in the early
stages of the pandemic differed from international guidance and actions taken by other
1 Unless otherwise stated, all data presented is reflective of the situation as of 1 October 2020
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countries, as well as some of the devolved administrations within the UK (here we
focus on the actions taken by the Scottish Government). As countries were shutting
down their borders and issuing stay-at-home orders as soon as the severity of the virus
was known, the UK withheld implementing a lockdown until some weeks later; this
time lag likely led to thousands of deaths that could have been prevented. When
countries were entering the global race to secure critical resources, the UK did not
follow suit, leading to shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE), testing kits
and ventilators, for both frontline healthcare workers but also social care providers for
the elderly (BBC 2020f). Moreover, the UK did not screen international arrivals at ports
of entry (having only enacted a 14-day quarantine rule for international arrivals in
June 2020), including at London-Heathrow—one of the world’s busiest airports—and
it abandoned mass testing and tracing measures, contrary to international guidance. To
date, the UK continues to struggle with implementing a robust test and trace system,
including through both testing centres and its COVID-19 smartphone app that runs in
England and Wales (Wise 2020; Griffin 2020).
Following this account, we examine the consequences of the UK Government’s
inaction in terms of its negative impact on the citizenry. Delayed implementation of
physical distancing measures and abandonment of community-wide testing allowed
uncontrolled spread of the virus, sharply increasing the number of infections. Without
the capacity to manage this surge, the healthcare system was nearly overwhelmed in
April, and measures to lessen the burden on the NHS led to greater harms. Among the
worst affected in the population have been health and social care workers and the
elderly, and there has been a stark disproportionate impact on Black, Asian and
minority ethnic (BAME) populations, not to mention other groups who are vulnerable
because of wider structural injustices.
Human rights require governments to protect their citizens’ health and wellbeing,
and thus in the final main section, the consequences of all of this inaction are explored
in light of these duties. While more stringent measures, as implemented in other
countries, may cause greater limitations of individual rights, such as liberty and
privacy, we argue herein that inaction may equally be found to have caused human
rights infringements through, for example, greater loss of life and insecurity of the
person.
Contrary to the messages of success promoted by the UK Government, there is
evidence that delays, errors and general incompetence have contributed to a substantial
humanitarian and human rights disaster.
In What Ways did the UK Fail to Respond Adequately to the Advent
of COVID-19 relative to International Guidance and Action in other
Countries?
When the first COVID-19 cases emerged in East Asia in January 2020, the UK
Government stated that the country was ‘well prepared’ (BBC 2020a). As the virus
spread to Iran and Italy in the subsequent weeks, this message was reiterated. And, as
the virus continued to then spread rapidly and devastatingly across Europe in early
March, the plan to ‘contain, delay, research and mitigate’ was supported by all of the
UK nations, being England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, within
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weeks, it became necessary to abandon this plan as cases surged and the UK found
itself overwhelmed and underprepared (Scally et al. 2020). This led to the nations
within the UK taking divergent approaches to tackle the pandemic. We unpack the UK-
wide failures in turn but first briefly describe the system of devolved powers in the four
nations’ kingdom.
Responsibility for legal and practical responses to infectious diseases is devolved
from the central government to the principal four UK jurisdictions, being England,
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In accordance with this, the Coronavirus Act
2020 conferred powers to take emergency action in response to the pandemic to
devolved ministers. While the responses were largely coordinated at the initial stages,
as the UK as a whole went into lockdown, the policies of each of the devolved nations
diverged as the situation developed. Statistical data on the impact of the virus suggest
that England has experienced an unusually high mortality and infection rate in com-
parison to other parts of the UK (Dickie and Burn-Murdoch 2020). Not all matters are
devolved, however, as the four nations do not operate within silos, and a necessary
reliance on Westminster remains where decisions must be taken at a UK national level.
For example, some key policies that undoubtedly significantly influence infection rates
and distribution, such as border and immigration control, remain reserved matters
decided by Westminster alone. The track and trace system, highlighted by all govern-
ments as being key to limiting infections and preventing a second wave, is most
effective when interoperable between all four nations; however, the politics of devolu-
tion challenge this possibility (Walker 2020; Parker 2020). Furthermore, the lack of
information fromWestminster on the effectiveness of the so-called NHS track and trace
system has drawn the criticism that it has obstructed the individual UK nations from
meeting their own public health objectives. Therefore, the UK’s failures may be
observed as a whole, despite some degree of variation between the nations.
Early Failures—Lack of Preparedness
When considering the extent of the UK Government’s inaction, we should start by
looking at action plans prior to the current pandemic. Most countries have pandemic
response plans, as they have duties to protect their populations and pandemics can
have devastating consequences for human life and national economies. When
effective, these plans are continuously reviewed and updated based on emerging
evidence and international guidance. The UK had a pandemic response plan in
place—but this was much more evident on paper than in reality. The limitations of
the UK’s preparedness were known for years prior to COVID-19. For example,
significant weaknesses in the UK’s emergency preparedness, resilience and re-
sponse (EPRR) plan were highlighted in 2016, yet the necessary remedial steps
do not appear to have been taken before the advent of COVID-19 (Nuki and
Gardner 2020). The simulation exercise carried out by NHS England in October
2016, ‘Exercise Cygnus’, was conducted under the auspices of Public Health
England and modelled an influenza pandemic; the leaked report showed that the
exercise found that the NHS in England would collapse from a lack of resources and
that a shortage of ventilators and capacity for disposal of the deceased would
present serious challenges. The NHS’s surge capacity was shown to be of serious
concern, with a shortage of PPE and ICU beds (Lambert 2020; Smyth 2016).
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The same team that ran Exercise Cygnus is currently tracking and responding to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Despite acute awareness of these weaknesses, it was precisely
this lack of surge capacity that required measures to ease the burden on the UK’s health
services, rather than focusing primarily upon supporting the health and wellbeing of the
UK population (Nuki and Gardner 2020). Poor pandemic planning also led to delays in
purchasing essential equipment and tests and the issuance of mixed messages about
public health practices. Furthermore, the UK Government has been accused of not
having the capacity to deal with a pandemic of this scale and severity as a result of
spending cuts on healthcare over the past years in the name of austerity following the
global financial crisis of 2007–2008 (Woodcock 2020b).
A Comparative Approach to Pandemic Responses2
As mentioned above, the WHO declared the virus a PHEIC on 30 January 2020 (World
Health Organization 2020d), and in early March 2020, NHS England and NHS
Improvement declared its first ever level 4 critical incident (Discombe 2020). This
meant that the response to the virus would be coordinated at a national level. Despite
these early warnings, the UK declined to join a European scheme to source personal
protective equipment (PPE). The UK’s focus on leaving the European Union led it to
miss eight meetings about the virus, between 13 February and 30 March, with EU
heads of state and health ministers (Tolhurst 2020). This, in turn, led to a missed
deadline to participate in a common purchase scheme for critical health supplies
(Boffey 2020; BBC 2020e). This would prove to be a serious error, creating shortages
of critical resources for frontline health workers. All too soon, NHS bosses were
warning of PPE shortages and a lack of surge capacity (Calvert et al. 2020; Foster
and Neville 2020). In late February 2020, a worst-case scenario report from the
government was leaked, suggesting that 500,000 Brits could die if the UK followed
its prevailing course of action—this was to avoid lockdown, resist scaling up of testing
and tracing regimes and not to implement any screening of international arrivals at
ports of entry. The UK Government did not act on these concerns (Lintern 2020) until
several weeks later.
Throughout March 2020, lives were continuing as normal in the UK, while all
around, its neighbours were shutting down due to a growing awareness that the virus
was airborne and spread through contact and physical proximity. In early-to-mid
March, for example, Italy, France and Spain went into lockdown. At this stage, the
UK was still managing some form of contact tracing, but continuance of mass public
gatherings allowed the virus to continue to spread (Perrigo 2020)—indeed, large
concerts and sporting activities went ahead well into March. While on 5 March, Greece
was closing its schools, following the path of Iran and Italy (Jones et al. 2020), Boris
Johnson, the UK Prime Minister, attended a Six Nations Rugby match only 2 days later
with 82,000 closely packed spectators (Archer 2020). When France banned large
events and began to introduce stricter social distancing measures (Landler and Castle
2020), and Ireland cancelled its St. Patrick’s Day parade on 9 March (BBC 2020b), the
UK Government did not find the need for a nationwide lockdown. Instead, the
2 A detailed timeline of the UK’s response, alongside international guidance and other countries actions, may
be found at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-51876784
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Cheltenham Festival went ahead, attracting crowds of over 250,000 people over the
course of 4 days (Morris 2020). When the WHO declared a pandemic on 11 March
(BBC 2020c), and Madrid closed its schools as it became the epicentre of Spain’s
coronavirus crisis (Jones 2020b), the UK welcomed 3000 Atletico Madrid fans flying
in from Spain to Liverpool (Atkinson 2020).
Despite international advice to prioritize testing, the UK abandoned its contact
tracing strategy on 12 March, on the basis that the UK did not have the capacity to
maintain the mass testing strategies that were being implemented in other countries.
The strategy seemed to be allowing the virus to spread through the population, so that a
form of ‘herd immunity’ would be developed (Shields 2020; Scally et al. 2020).
Following this, the WHO stated that ‘tracing every contact must be the backbone of
the response in every country’ (World Health Organisation 2020a) yet mass testing
would not resume in the UK until many months after. Despite the UK having shifted to
the ‘delay’ phase, the order to physically distance did not follow for another 4 days.
Even so, these measures were not legally binding, nor were businesses required to
close. Moreover, despite Europe being declared by the WHO as the epicentre of the
pandemic in March (World Health Organization 2020c), the UK continued to freely
allow arrivals into the country from known hotspots, including Wuhan, northern Italy
and Iran (Woodcock 2020a).
The lack of enforced physical distancing measures and continuance of mass public
gatherings led directly to cases rising exponentially in the UK. It eventually became
obvious that indoor spaces, such as offices, schools, restaurants and pubs, would have
to close. Yet, the UK Government representatives continued to claim that the country
was managing well, suggesting that PPE and capacity shortages had been resolved
(Horton 2020). Behind these claims, however, the UK had downgraded its guidance on
PPE, from level 4 to level 3 (Scally et al. 2020). It was discharging elderly patients from
hospitals into care homes without testing or quarantining in order to increase the
number of available hospital beds for the coming waves of infected patients (Rushton
and Barnes 2020). This proved to be catastrophic, as infected elderly patients further
spread the virus into care homes, leading to mass casualties across the country.
The UK only entered lockdown on 23 March (Brown 2020), nearly 2 weeks after
most of Europe had done so. By this point, there were 967 recorded cases, but due to
the lack of testing, it is likely this in fact was much higher. At that stage, the UK had yet
to reach its own target of 25,000 tests per today (Panjwani 2020). By 7 April, the UK
had conducted only a fifth of the number of tests as Germany and the death toll was
over 10,000 (Hall and Buck 2020). By 18 April, it was recognized that PPE was
running out (Milligan 2020; Siddique 2020; Blackall 2020). The death toll continued to
rise exponentially, comprised in large part of deaths in care homes (O'Dowd 2020).
Despite this, the government rejected a plan to lock down care homes (Booth 2020);
meanwhile, 10% of these deaths were among frontline health workers, many of whom
had repeatedly voiced concerns about a lack of PPE (Torjensen 2020).
The UK Westminster Government began to exit its lockdown on 11 May, against
the WHO advice that it should not do so without a fully functioning test and trace
system (Wood 2020); arguably, the consequences of this have been evidenced with the
second wave that hit the UK in September. Moreover, this exit from lockdown differed
from approaches taken in the governments of the nations across the UK. For example,
the Scottish Government has been somewhat more cautious about emerging from
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lockdown, implementing a four-phase approach that has sought to avoid reopening
establishments and social gatherings at quick pace (Deputy First Minister 2020).
Whereas, to take one example, pubs and restaurants could reopen in England on 4
July with physical distancing measures in place (in principle, though whether this was
enforced is open to question), this did not happen in Scotland until 15 July; whereas
gyms reopened in England on 25 July, they did not in Wales until 10 August and in
Scotland until 31 August. Whereas wearing a face covering became mandatory in
shops and supermarkets in England only from 24 July, they were mandatory in
Scotland since 10 July (in all instances subject to relatively loose ‘legitimate exemp-
tion’ criteria). These different approaches, not surprisingly, have led to political
tensions, with some commentators calling for a more unified approach across the
country and with others warning that devolved administrations (which have responsi-
bility over heath and public health) following the UK Government’s approach—which
applies in respects to England only, with the notable exception of border control—
would exacerbate rising case levels and deaths (Marshall 2020). As noted above, as of
the time of writing, the UK is, as is much of Europe, experiencing a second wave of the
virus and consequently, we again are seeing the four nations taking different ap-
proaches to limit the rise in cases and fatalities.
It was not just the devolved administrations that decided to take a more cautious
approach to emerging from lockdown; various leading medical bodies expressed
concern over the risks of easing the lockdown too soon, and the number of cases and
deaths were still too high to allow for effective testing and tracing (English and Rae
2020). The track and trace smartphone app developed by NHSX in England faced a
significant number of teething problems and was only rolled out in late September (and
continues to face problems) (Bosley 2020; Wise 2020; Griffin 2020; Wright and
Bodkin 2020); and the so-called NHS Test and Trace programme in England has
repeatedly been unable to reach up to a third of persons (Warrell and Hughes 2020;
Marsh 2020). Indeed, The Guardian newspaper reported in July 2020 that in areas with
the highest infection rates in England, the proportion of close contacts of infected
people being reached was far below 80%, the level the government’s scientific advisers
say is required for test and trace to be effective (Halliday 2020); in Luton, only 47% of
at-risk people were contacted by test and trace. Worse, the UK Government itself
admitted the so-called NHS Test and Trace programme it launched for England on 28
May was unlawful, as it violated the Data Protection Act 2018 in failing to conduct a
data privacy impact assessment (DPIA) (Manthorpe 2020). Other routes for dealing
with the pandemic, such as vaccines or effective medication, are unavailable or still in
trial phases (Gartner et al. 2020); there is no guarantee either an effective (or widely
available) vaccine or treatment will be developed, much less in the near future. Already,
following England’s exit from the 23 March lockdown, there have been surges across
all areas of the country, requiring local lockdowns, such as in the city of Leicester in
late June (BBC 2020g) and more recently in Cardiff and Swansea, and intermediate
lockdowns, such as requiring university students in Manchester to self-isolate ‘with
immediate effect’ (BBC 2020h). This is in contrast to other countries that are reporting
declines in numbers of new cases, despite having implemented their lockdown exit
plans and beginning to emerge from them.
As this account outlines, the UK Government often departed from and fell behind
international guidance and action, influencing not only the number of confirmed cases
Asian Bioethics Review
in the country but also the country’s ability to manage these, leading to a staggeringly
high case fatality rate (CFR) in comparison with the global average (Our World in Data
2020a). As we will see, the UK Government’s response all stands apart from those
taken by other countries, including those who might otherwise be seen as lacking the
resources and robust public health infrastructure to tackle a pandemic.
Global Responses to COVID-19: Where and How did they Differ?
Among those large countries with the lowest number of cases and deaths to date
are Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Taiwan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South
Korea and New Zealand (Our World in Data 2020a; Our World in Data 2020c;
Bremmer 2020). As we can see, success is not dictated necessarily by GDP per
capita; rather, it has been more a result of robust planning and preparedness
(including test and trace programmes), government coordination across vertical
and horizontal levels (i.e. between central and local governments and across
ministries), strict border controls, political commitment and close involvement
with competent public health experts.
Vietnam, recognizing early on its medical system could be overwhelmed,
opted for strong prevention early on as soon as reports emerged from China,
leading it to have reported around 1100 cases (averaging 11 cases per million
people) and only 35 confirmed deaths as of the time of writing (Vietnam
Ministry of Health 2020). Although it may be that these low numbers are linked
to limited testing and challenges in the attribution of cause of death, it is safe to
assume the numbers are significantly low given that there is no reporting of
health services being overstretched, and a similar picture seems to have endured
across much of Southeast Asia. Sri Lanka, to take another example, went into
swift and strict lockdown, shutting down all ports of entry to international
arrivals and mandating face mask wearing in public spaces, and, to date, has
reported only 13 deaths (Epidemiology Unit 2020).
Most remarkably perhaps, Taiwan, despite not shutting down the country and its
economy, and by implementing comprehensive contact tracing through SIM cards to
ensure compliance with quarantine requirements, has only reported just over 500 cases
and 7 confirmed deaths. Additionally, the government’s response, setting strict precau-
tionary measures such as taking temperatures and providing sanitiser, has been largely
regarded as credible (Hancocks 2020).
South Korea reacted rapidly and early on, scaling up testing even before its number
of confirmed cases exceeded a hundred incidences, to a point where they even had
sufficient resources to export testing kits (Ferrier 2020). Again, even without a lock-
down, the cases are relatively low at 462 per million (Taiwan Centers for Disease
Control 2020).
In common with these countries were populations who were willing to make trade-
offs of commerce and movement, and, in some cases, privacy, for their safety. Outside
South and East Asia, despite a very different political system, New Zealand performed
well. New Zealand shut its borders less than 3 weeks after their first case, and a week
later implemented a strict lockdown in which individuals could only socialize within
their household. At the time of writing, it has reported only 367 cases per million and a
CFR of around 1.7%.
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What are the Main Consequences of this in Terms of Negative Impact
on the Citizenry?
A common characteristic in all of the countries with low case levels and death tolls is
that they all reacted quickly, decisively and robustly to the pandemic. Important
measures included thorough pandemic planning (as well as implementation of recom-
mendations from reports), adequate surge capacity and resources, rapid and well-
communicated responses such as implementation of stay home orders and comprehen-
sive testing and tracing systems. In contrast, the UK Government’s decision not to take
decisive action until late March 2020 allowed shortages of vital health equipment,
including tests, to become a critical issue.
In short, the UK Government downplayed the severity of the pandemic until it was
too late. Even when modelling suggested there could be 500,000 deaths, the Govern-
ment maintained they were ‘well prepared’. In fact, the UK was unprepared for a
pandemic of this severity, fighting a high-risk virus with a plan best suited for a low-
risk flu. By allowing the virus to spread through the country in their ‘delay’ phase, the
UK placed the lives of its citizens directly at risk. Countries which were willing to react
quickly and implement admittedly stringent measures kept many of their citizens from
contracting the virus. Indeed, in some countries, such as South Korea, a lockdown was
not required because of good planning, clear public communication and exceptionally
thorough tracking and tracing. For all countries that can be seen to have managed the
initial wave of COVID-19 well, their actions have all relied on effective contact tracing,
with the result that they continue to be capable of ensuring outbreaks remain localized
(Sridhar 2020).
Confirmed Cases and Deaths
The UK’s infection cases per million is high, but more concerning is its CFR, which is
among the worst in the world. By shifting from the ‘contain’ to the ‘delay’ phase and
abandoning testing in the early stages, the continuance of public gatherings in the UK
allowed the virus to spread all the more extensively. Even when government measures
were eventually implemented to encourage or require physical distancing, messages as
to what was permitted were considered unclear, and early confusion reduced their
effectiveness (Perrigo 2020). Beyond this, the abandonment of widespread testing was
a further grave error. A test for the virus was developed by 10 January, but due to the
UK adopting a centralized approach run out of Public Health England, without a view
to make use of the hundreds of public and private laboratories across the country, the
capacity for testing could not keep pace with the surge in cases (Talbot 2020). This
made it impossible to follow international advice to use testing to trace and contain new
cases of the virus.
These two key failures allowed the heightened transmission and lack of containment
of the virus, contributing to the high number of cases. It has been suggested that, due to
the paucity of testing at early stages, the case load in the first few months of the
pandemic may have been almost twice what was reported—even compared to the
second wave of cases that the UK (and other European countries) were facing in
August, September and October—as many individuals (particularly those who are
younger and in good health) are asymptomatic or only suffer mild symptoms and thus
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may be inclined not to self-report (Connors and Haughton 2020; Schraer 2020). Most
significantly, however, it was the lack of resources and capacity which contributed to
the high number of deaths. Moreover, these deaths were not spread evenly throughout
the population, but rather focused on already vulnerable groups.
Increased Vulnerability of Marginalized Groups
Failure to secure critical resources such as PPE and ventilators at an early stage left the
UK at the back of the global queue for relevant trade deals. Global supplies of these
resources dried up rapidly as countries competed, and when cases spiked, Britain’s
failure to be well prepared became most evident. At times, this left patients without the
care they needed, not to mention the staff working without protection in a high-risk
environment. As such, a number of health professionals contracted the virus, though
not all were symptomatic (Torjensen 2020). This meant they may have transmitted the
virus to their patients, who were already in a vulnerable state.
As the UK did not move quickly to improve the capacity of its already underfunded
healthcare system, it was necessary to introduce measures which would ease the burden
on the NHS, rather than with a sole focus on the health of every individual. One of
these was the discharge of elderly patients into care homes, without testing or
quarantining, exposing some of the most vulnerable persons in our society to the virus.
The Government was aware that age was a contributing factor to fatality rates, yet in an
attempt to create capacity, it neglected those at greatest risk. It has become all too
evident that many care homes do not have the resources necessary to keep their
residents safe. Between 2 March and 12 June, almost 20,000 care home deaths were
directly attributable to COVID-19, making up almost 50% of the total deaths in the UK
(Office for National Statistics 2020a). Numerous analysts have also pointed to the
impact of the pandemic on the BAME communities in the UK and in other countries,
noting that the pandemic is disproportionately affecting these communities and those
facing the worst of structural injustices, in particular those living in socially deprived
areas of the country and without adequate access to healthcare (Mamluk and Jones
2020; Butcher and Massey 2020; Venkatapuram 2020). This has even been acknowl-
edged by the UK Government itself in a report from Public Health England (Public
Health England 2020a).
Restrictions to Liberty
Lockdown in the UK lasted nearly 4 months, with varying degrees of restrictions
between the nations. Arguably, because of the UK Government’s failure to exercise
strong and competent leadership, particularly when the pandemic began to spread
across Europe, lockdown had to extend over a longer period as case numbers continued
to rise, rather than fall. This has caused millions to lose their jobs, seriously damaged
the economy and, in itself, caused harm to individuals’ physical and mental health.
Such a prolonged period of mandated cessation of free movement could have been
avoided through a number of different strategies, as seen in other countries, such as
strong contact tracing measures, as in East and Southeast Asia, or simply early
lockdown and appropriate management of cases to ensure it did not become the
widespread uncontrollable crisis that it did. Even now, however, as a result of weakness
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in the test and trace and the smartphone app, the UK—particularly in more densely
populated England—is not succeeding in tracking all cases, which may lead to a second
nationwide lockdown, or, as is now the case, sporadic, repeated need for
localised ockdowns. Thus, while draconian restrictions of liberty have been shown
not to be a necessary consequence of a pandemic when countries implement effective
complementary strategies, the irony of the UK Government’s approach is that there will
likely be the ongoing and pernicious threat of restrictions of liberty because of failures
to manage the pandemic well.
All of this leads us to consider what impact this serial inaction and incompetent
decision-making on the part of the UK Government in Westminster has had on core
human rights and what lessons we might learn from the fiasco.
Which Human Rights have been Implicated and What are
the Governmental Duties to Prevent them?
The domain of human rights protection operates at international, European and domes-
tic levels. Internationally, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966) recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the UK is a signatory to
this instrument albeit that it is not directly enforceable domestically. The relevance of
this particular Article, and human rights more generally, has been well addressed
elsewhere, especially as they relate to pandemics and preparedness assessed through
the perspective of human rights (Eccleston-Turner and Brassington 2020; Gostin and
Mason Meier 2020). Moreover, the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Deroga-
tion Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by
the UN Economic and Social Council in 1984, serve as an important benchmark
against which to assess states’ action in times of emergency and to guard against
violations of human rights in the name of addressing a crisis. We address their
relevance to the current context below. For now, and primarily because of restriction
of space, we confine the following discussion to the human rights that are directly
enforceable in the UK, namely, those arising under the European Convention on
Human Rights, as embodied in domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998.
It is our contention that the UK Government’s inaction and failures, seen in the
comparative light of international guidance and steps taken by governments both in
other countries and even within the devolved administrations of the UK, have led to
significant human rights implications and inequalities. As we have argued, in the UK’s
case, the human rights concerns stem not from the specific legislative measures enacted
in Westminster to combat the pandemic (which in our view have been proportionate
and within the ambit of public health powers), but rather from the inaction and
incompetence under which the measures were implemented and from the absence at
times in implementing any measures at all.
Human rights are the basic rights and freedoms that belong to everyone, regardless
of status. Human rights operate on the principle that, as Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights declares, ‘All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights’. Human rights are clearly defined in several cornerstone normative
instruments and are protected under British, European and international laws, including
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in the UK, under the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporate into UK law the rights
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Human rights
require that public authorities promote and protect the human rights of their citizens
and the capability for citizens to flourish as citizens in a society. This obligation by the
state includes, among other things, promoting and protecting rights to health and
wellbeing. Accordingly, public authorities owe duties to citizens by ensuring that there
is an adequate public health infrastructure that is marked by sufficient degrees of
preparedness, prevention, containment and treatment, as tools to protect individuals
who are most vulnerable.
Against the background of the response pandemic as outlined above, in principle—
that is, what we would come to expect rather than what would come to fruition—the
most affected human right is the right to life set out in Article 2 of the ECHR
(‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law’), and also reflected in Article 3
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of person’). This human right requires not only that the state not take the
lives of its citizens except in those rare exceptions permitted under law but also that the
state take positive action to protect lives. In the context of COVID-19, this would mean
that the UK Government has an obligation to enact measures that seek to protect the
population’s health from the virus. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) has found positive obligations to arise under Article 2 in a number of different
contexts, including in the context of healthcare (Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy; Vo v
France). Moreover, countries may also be under a positive obligation to prevent the
spreading of contagious disease (Poghosyan v Georgia, Ghavtadze v Georgia, Shelley
v the United Kingdom). For example, in Shelley v the United Kingdom, a case
concerning a prisoner who complained that a decision to provide disinfecting tablets
instead of needle exchange programmes failed to sufficiently address the risks caused
by the sharing of infected needles, the ECtHR observed that ‘[…] it is not excluded that
a positive obligation might arise to eradicate or prevent the spread of a particular
disease or infection’.
To this end, we posit that Article 2 has been implicated by much of the UK’s
inaction, such as the failure to provide the proper protective equipment to healthcare
staff, discharging potentially infected individuals into care homes, avoiding lockdown
until weeks after other countries had done and even allowing the number of cases to
reach such high levels by abandoning widespread test and trace. The evidence shows
that the government allowed a high-risk virus to spread throughout the country without
the proper means to protect citizens from the most severe effects. A CFR above 10% is
unacceptable when contrasted to percentages of 1–2% in neighbouring countries with
similar (or indeed) worse healthcare systems and infrastructures. Within the high
mortality figures, the disparities in the affected persons, caused both directly and
indirectly by governmental action, are in contravention of the government’s duties to
promote equality. To this end, we note that the ECHR case of Lopes de Sousa
Fernandes v Portugal has held that a country’s obligation to establish a regulatory
framework for healthcare must be understood in a broad sense, which includes the duty
to ensure the effective functioning of that regulatory framework, and thus encompass
necessary measures to ensure implementation, including supervision and enforcement.
Prof Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou of the University of Liverpool has carefully analysed the
implications of Article 2 ECHR. He argues that a court would find a violation of Article
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2 if there was discriminatory treatment or flagrant denial of medical help (Dzehtsiarou
2020); in our view, there are grounds to make a claim that the UK’s failure to respond
to the pandemic in March with proper PPE distributed across healthcare workers,
robust lockdown early on, testing at wide scale for the virus and trace contacts
effectively and testing elderly patients before discharging them from hospitals amounts
to serious violations of UK citizens’ right to life.
Other ECHR human rights potentially, though less likely, implicated by the UK
Government’s inaction and incompetence are the following:
& Article 3 (‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment’)—which we note has no exculpatory provisions. Here,
countries must refrain from treatment which damages a person’s physical health or
causes them mental or psychological harm. Countries may also be obliged to take
positive measures to protect the physical and mental health of individuals for whom
it assumes special responsibility. In the context of COVID-19, denial of adequate
medical treatment, such as access to a hospital, could trigger Article 3. As
Dzehtsiarou (2020) observes, two criteria need to be satisfied here: the treatment
or lack thereof needs to reach the minimal level of severity and the state’s
involvement should be proved. This might be an uphill battle: ‘Proving that the
state policy was a reason for overcrowded hospitals is a futile exercise at the ECtHR
in times of pandemic’ (Dzehtsiarou 2020).
& Article 5 (‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person’). Here, as noted
above, initial concern was raised that the legislative measures passed by the UK
Government would unduly restrict one’s liberty. In other words, quarantine (or
lockdown) could be an unjust deprivation of liberty. However, the exculpatory
provision of Article 5(e)—‘the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the
spreading of infectious diseases’, and the conditions under which it should be done
lawfully, viz. be made in accordance with national law, be limited in time and it
should serve the purpose it is initiated for—namely, preventing spreading of
infectious diseases, suggests that this human right would not be violated. The
alternative argument—that lockdown has extended far beyond what was necessary
and proportionate because of the government’s inability to get a handle on the
virus—would also appear to be an uphill battle, largely because of the UK
government’s laissez faire approach to movement restrictions. If anything, the
government would be able to point to an absence of restrictions on liberty sufficient
to trigger Article 5. Our point, however, is a concern with a protracted and
prolonged period of lockdowns that will undoubtedly arise as a result of this
uncoordinated and unprincipled approach. While this might not raise Article 5
concerns per se, it might return us to Article 3: does the de facto state policy of
inaction ultimately amount to inhuman and degrading treatment for citizens left in a
cycle of uncertainty and ever-present threat of restriction of movement?
& Article 8 (‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence’). This human right is certainly engaged by the govern-
ment’s response to the pandemic; indeed, all people’s right to respect for private life
around the world are implicated in times of pandemics, as governments seek to
collect personal information concerning one’s health in an effort to contain and
control the spread of a contagious disease. In the context of COVID-19, however,
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concerns have been raised about the smartphone apps and the sharing of confiden-
tial patient information between public authorities, particularly from doctors and
public health officials to law enforcement agencies. Article 8 permits interference
with one’s right to respect for private life, provided such interference is necessary
and proportionate. Moreover, Article 8(2) permits interference where ‘[it] is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society […] for the
protection of health […]’. It is beyond the scope of our article to detail the scope of
this expansive human right, but the case law would suggest that a claim concerning
Article 8 would have stronger grounds if based on allegations concerning wide-
spread collection and sharing of confidential patient information or personal data
(e.g. asking people to disclose their health and other personal information), rather
than allegations that government policies to prevent the spread of COVID-19
interfered with one’s right to respect for private life. As far as we are aware, Article
8 has not yet been tested in a court of law in the context of a wider general
preventive ground of an epidemic. This said, given the UK Government’s incom-
petent rollout of the smartphone COVID-19 tracing app and invocation of the
notice provision under Regulation 3(4) of the Health Service Control of Patient
Information Regulations 2002 to require organizations such as GP surgeries, NHS
trusts and private healthcare organizations to disclose to other sectors and organi-
zations (including private companies) confidential patient information for broadly
defined ‘COVID-19 purposes’, concerns are certainly raised about undue interfer-
ence with this human right (Secretary of State for Health and Social Care 2020).
& Article 11 (‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom
of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interests’). This human right is experienced most pronouncedly
in the ban many countries have enacted on large public gatherings to prevent the
rapid spread of COVID-19 (e.g. no more or significantly reduced attendance in
stadiums, concert halls, exhibition centres, theatres and so on). While in other
countries, legitimate concerns may be raised that these measures might have been
invoked to stifle political expression, in the UK, these measures are more likely
seen as justifiable interference to prevent the spread of the virus. As with Article 8,
however, any exceptions to Article 11 are only justifiable when they are necessary
and proportionate. Sustained engagement with Article 11 rights because of ongoing
governmental incompetence to deal effectively with the COVID-19 virus raises
questions about how far the UK Government could continue to rely on the
exceptions in an extended period of lockdowns and hand-to-mouth measures
responding to new COVID-19 cases.
It is important to recognize that there have already been a number of Article 8
challenges to the lockdown—for example, R (Dolan and Ors) v Secretary of State
for Health and Social Care and Secretary of State for Education [2020] EWHC 1786
(Admin)—but as we have argued, the initial measures in the first 6 months of the
pandemic arguably may be seen as necessary and proportionate in light of the severity
of the virus; in other words, these fall within the exculpatory provisions seen in the
famous ‘paragraph 2’ of human rights (Laurie 2020). However, our contention is that
faster, more decisive and more robust action to prevent rapid spread and in turn the high
number of cases could have enabled a nearly 4-month lockdown to be shorter;
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moreover, these failures will likely extend the period of uncertainty and future lock-
downs, whether these are on a local, regional or national basis. Most importantly,
capacity for mass testing and means of tracking and tracing instances of the virus would
have enabled better containment, as demonstrated in South Asia and Australasia, and as
such shorter lockdown periods. Even now as the UK attempts to avoid
national lockdown, there are insufficient measures in place to ensure that further
outbreaks are unlikely. It will not be surprising to see a repeated rise in ‘hotspot’
lockdowns over the coming months and longer, for as long as international travel is
permitted and neither an effective vaccine nor treatment are available.
From the legal standpoint, it must be recognised that the UK has certainly acted to
enact enabling legislation with respect to its response to COVID-19. Notable examples
are the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, and
equivalent measures coming from the devolved administrations, and—in September
2020—the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (No. 2) (England) (Amend-
ment) (No. 4) Regulations 2020. However, these last provisions were published only
minutes before the Act came into force, allowing no time for appropriate scrutiny.
There are multiple human rights objections that can be raised to such legislative moves.
For example, concerning the first set of regulations, there was no requirement for the
Secretary of State to have regard to the rights and freedoms that the provisions
restricted. As to the second example, due process alone requires adequate opportunity
for scrutiny of any law that has as its objective the curtailment of citizens’ rights and
freedoms. Indeed, colleagues have written elsewhere about the myriad ways in which
such provisions—as positive empowerment of the state to act—are violations of human
rights (Hoar 2020). In contrast, and to continue with our central theme of violation
through inaction, we contend that even these attempts to deploy law in the face of the
pandemic are, in fact, egregious examples of failures in pandemic preparedness and due
respect for human rights. This is because the legislation itself is a further evidence of
inaction on the part of the UK Government relative to what is required under human
right laws.
In making this argument, we rely on the international Siracusa Principles, mentioned
above. These make specific provision in the context of public health, notably that
measures responding to an emergency must be:
1) Provided for and carried out in accordance with law
2) Directed toward a legitimate objective of general interest
3) Strictly necessary in a democratic society to achieve the objective
4) The least intrusive and restrictive to achieve the objective
5) Based on scientific evidence and neither arbitrary nor discriminatory in application
6) Of limited duration, respectful of human dignity and subject to review
This reflects the general requirement for proportionality of response in all matters,
which in turn requires transparent explanation and justification of all measures under-
taken through law. Yet, the September 2020 Regulations merely contain a bare
statement in the Introductory Text to the effect ‘The Secretary of State considers that
the restrictions and requirements imposed by [The Regulations] are proportionate to
what they seek to achieve, which is a public health response to that threat’. The lack of
parliamentary time to assess this claim falls foul of both the letter and the spirit of the
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Siracusa Principles. Furthermore, in the Explanatory Note, it is stated: ‘No impact
assessment has been carried out for these Regulations’. This is in direct contradiction to
Principle 4. The notion of ‘in accordance with law’ stated in Principle 1 is well
recognized in the human rights field to include the ‘knowability’ of the law. Once
again, the lack of transparency in the production of these laws suggests a serious
breach. And finally, as to Principle 6, the requirement that laws be ‘subject to review’
can be assessed by the UK Government’s own benchmark criteria made public on 16
April 2020. These were drafted after a review of the lockdown to that date:
& That the NHS is able to cope
& A ‘sustained and consistent’ fall in the daily death rate
& Reliable data showing the rate of infection was decreasing to ‘manageable levels’
& That the supply of tests and PPE could meet future demand
& That the government could be confident that any adjustments would not risk a
second peak (BBC 2020d)
While these criteria were used to defend an extension of lockdown, the repeated
legislative initiatives since then suggest that unless and until criteria such as these are
met, regulations of the kind discussed here will continue to be promulgated. Yet, it is
precisely because of an uncertain and disputed scientific basis, the chaos of track and
trace in the UK and the sustained and unacceptable death rate that these criteria will
remain elusive. Thus, violation is heaped upon violation. By any human rights stan-
dard, the UK has failed its citizens on an unconscionable scale.
Conclusion
The UK’s response to the pandemic has lagged far behind that of other countries and
international guidance. Despite being forewarned in early January by the WHO of the
potentially severe consequences of the virus, the UK was not forearmed, which later led to
shortages in resources when they were most critically needed. The UK’s delayed response,
implementing physical distancing measures much later than its neighbours in Europe (and
across much of the globe), allowed case numbers to increase exponentially, placing greater
numbers of its citizens’ lives at risk. Its weaknesses and failures in planning to test, track and
trace both at the start and as it attempts to exit lockdown continue to place its citizens’ lives at
risk, particularly those who are already vulnerable. The implications of these failures are all
too clear, when compared to the number of cases, deaths and fatality ratesworldwide. Rather
than delaying the inevitable, the UK Government ought to have responded better to the
pandemic and, in doing so, avoided the serious human right implications and likely
unjustifiable infringements that have occurred.
Through all this, we offer three lessons that should be learnt from the UK Govern-
ment’s response to COVID-19:
1. Failing to prepare means you prepare to fail. Foremost, what we have seen is a
failure by the UK Government to prepare for COVID-19, both in terms of
anticipatory measures and during the response phase of the pandemic. While this
specific pandemic could have not been foreseen, a pandemic certainly was a
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‘known unknown’—something that had a reasonable chance of occurring in the
near future. Moreover, the UK Government had ample time to prepare in the 2 months
preceding the wave that hit the country in March 2020—the evidence was incontro-
vertible from the experiences of other countries. The UK acted too late and too
haphazardly. Relatedly, the UK Government failed to heed the clear findings and
recommendations from the Exercise Cygnus simulation run in 2016 to ensure sufficient
amount of PPE was available and distributed across the country and more generally to
ensure the capability and capacity to surge resources into key areas.
2. Over-centralisation can perpetuate risk of failure. In the UK’s case, relying solely
on Public Health England—which had 290 people across the entire country—to
coordinate testing and tracing early on undoubtedly has led to thousands of cases
going untested, not to mention very likely a considerable number of unnecessary
deaths. As The Economist (2020a) has noted: ‘Complaints about centralisation
persist. Local authorities are struggling to get data from NHS Test and Trace.
According to Leicester’s mayor, Sir Peter Soulsby, the city’s recent outbreak was
exacerbated by poor-quality data and delays before they were provided. They are,
he says, still too slow to arrive—the last batch came [two weeks prior]—and they
identify cases only at a postcode level, without addresses or workplaces, and with
ethnicity for only a minority of cases’. It is telling that the putative “United”
Kingdom has fragmented into its constituent countries as the devolved adminis-
trations realized that the UK Westminster response was not serving the interests of
their own citizens. Additionally, it is far from clear that the UK Government’s
response to Public Health England’s alleged failings in coordination—the creation
in August 2020 of a new National Institute for Health Protection (and an uncertain
future for Public Health England)—will necessarily resolve the challenges associ-
ated with the UK’s centralized system of governance and government. Indeed,
given that the NIHP aims to bring together Public Health England, NHS Test and
Trace and the Joint Biosecurity Centre, this actually suggests that the Government
remains committed to centralize decision-making and operate top-down.
3. Contrary to anticipated concerns about draconian government action, future
preparedness for pandemics must take account of likely governmental inaction
and incompetence. In our view, there are serious concerns about potential infringe-
ment of core human rights, most particularly Article 2 ECHR. In assessing the UK
Government’s response to COVID-19, people’s right to life—especially those who
are most vulnerable—has manifestly been affected in the worst ways possible. The
UK Government failed to uphold its positive obligations owing to its citizens to
ensure PPE was available for frontline healthcare workers, testing capacity and
contact tracing could be surged when the virus became an epidemic in the country
and that no patients would be discharged from hospitals back into the community
without first testing them for the virus.
We sincerely hope that this analysis brings further strength and support to the calls that
the UK Government launch an independent inquiry into what went wrong, to prevent
such an outcome from ever happening again. Sadly, as the pandemic looks set to
continue for an uncertain amount of time, there remain myriad lessons to be learned
about what it means to show due respect for human rights especially as matters may
well become worse before they become better.
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